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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ALLEN HALLSTROl\1 and 
.JOHANNA C. HALL.STROM, 
Plaint~ffs-Respondents 
vs. 
L. l\L BUHLER and 
MONICA BUHLER, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants 
Case No. 
9730 
Defendants' -Appellants' Brief Q:n Appeal 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought to foreclose a mortgage 
given to guarantee the performance of a third party 
under a real estate contract covering property in Idaho. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The judgment appealed from was rendered by the 
lower court at pretrial conference in favor of plaintiff. 
Defendant appeals from that judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant asks that the Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Decree be set aside and the case be 
remanded for trial of the issues raised on this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1956 one Teeples sold the defendant Buhler a 
farm in Idaho under a real estwte contract. In 1958, after 
improving it, Buhler sold the farm on contract to .a man 
named Snyder (R. 24-31). Under the terms of this con-
tract Snyder assumed all of the outstanding obligations 
against the farm property and in addition agreed to 
pay Buhler $28,641.80 for his equity. The contract re-
quired that payments on this equity be made on the 1st 
of December of each year, starting in 1959, at the rate 
of $2.,000.00 per year, plus in!terest. 
Thereafter, on or about August 5, 1959, Buhler 
needed funds, and arranged to receive $14,371.88 from 
Plaintiff Hallstrom. Under the arrangement agreed up-
on between them Buhler assigned all of his right, title 
and interest in and to bo1th the Teeples-Buhler contract 
and the Buhler-Snyder contract to H'allstrom (R. 50), 
but Hallstrom admits that only $19,938.86 of the contract 
equity was to pass (C01nplaint, R.2). 
In addition to the contracts assigned, Buhler agre•ed 
to guarantee that Snyder would perform under the con-
tract. The guaranty :took the form of and was secured by 
a mortgage which Buhler gave Hallstrom on his home 
in Salt Lake City (R. 5, 6). This mortgage guaranteed 
"the payment by said William Snyder and Irene Louise 
Snyder, of the sums that will be due and payable to the 
above named mortgagees [HallstrOin] under said con-
tract and assignment" (R. 5). ·The amount of the mort-
gage given to guarantee Snyder's performance was 
$25,615.96, an amount equal to $19,938.86 plus the inter-
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est which Hallstrom would receive when the contract was 
perfonned by Snyder in accordance with its terms (R.S.2). 
The contracts were perfonned until December of 
1960 when Snyder defaulted (R.2). On January 13, 1961 
Hallstrom conunenced this action to foreclose the mort-
gage alleging that the balance due thereon was $17,938.86 
(R.l-6). Through counsel Buhler filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim (R.10-13) and an Amendment to the Coun-
terclaim (R.14,15). Hallstrom replied to the Counter-
claims and the issues were joined. 
1Sometime between December 1, 1960 and May 6, 1961 
Hallstrom apparently obtained ti!tle to the Idaho farm 
from Teeples, because on the latter date he sold the farm 
in Idaho on contract to a man named Adams for $25,-
000.00, the contract reciting a down payment of $10,-
000.00 (R.38,39). 
On January 10, 1962 pretrial was held and an order 
was entered granting I-Iallstrom "judgment as prayed" 
(R.18,19). No evidence was introduced and no transcript 
of the proceedings at pretrial exists except the Pre-Trial 
Order itself (R.18). Buhler thereafter filed a motion for 
adoption of a Supplemental Pre-Trial Order (R.45) and 
l\Iotion for Summary Judgment (R.44). Both of these 
motions were supported by Buhler's affidavit with ex .. 
hibits attached (R.20-42). These motions were denied 
on April17, 1962 (R.70). On April16, 1962 Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were entered 
(R.71-83). 
The Findings of Fact recite that the principal of the 
mortgage as of January 10, 1962 was $18,167.31, together 
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with interest accrued on the principal sun1 to that date; 
they also recite that I-Iallstrmn paid Teeples $1,180.00, 
that Hallstrom paid $967.50 on the mortgage and $302.02 
for taxes, all payments attributable to the Idaho prop-
erty, and that interest on all of the foregoing to January 
10, 1962 came to $169.51; they also state that plaintiff 
was entitled to attorneys' fees of $1,500.00, plus costs of 
$15.20 . .All of this, when added, comes to $22,301.54, plus 
interest on $18,167.31. The Conclusions of L·aw recite the 
same figures. 
On the other hand, the complaint makes no mention 
of .anything but the principal due under the mortgage, 
recited at $17,938.86, plus interest to date of judgment, 
attorney's fees and costs, a total of $19,454.06 (R. 1-4). 
On April 25, 1962, Buhler retained his present coun-
sel who filed a motion to set aside the Findings, Con-
clusions and Decree or in the alternative, to amend them. 
(R.84-86). The motion was denied July 13, 1962. (R.89) . 
.ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY .ARGUl\IENT 
The whole purpose of this appeal is to obtain a trial 
of the issues raised by the pleadings and motions. .All 
of the points hereinafter raised are directed solely to 
that end. This brief contends that the trial judge acted 
improperly in entering judgment for Plaintiffs Hall-
strom at the time of the Pre-Trial, and in denying subse-
quent motions designed to correct that error. The ple-ad-
ings and 1notions presented substantial is.sues of law and 
fact which have a direct bearing on the Hallstroms' right 
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to recover and upon the amount they are entitled to re-
cover. 
We call particular attention of this Court to the 
inter-relat~on of the issues presented in Points I and II. 
Defendant contends that the transaction entered into 
between himself and the Hallstroms was that of a loan 
which called for inteTest at a usurious rate. Thus, the 
Hallstroms paid $1 ±,371.88 to Buhler and received hack 
an assignment of Buhler's equity in the Idaho real estate 
contract to the extent of $19,938.86, plus accruing inter-
Pst. The payment of that sum was unequivocally guar-
anteed by Buhler and one other (Funk, R.21) and the 
guaranty was secured by a mortgage on Buhler's home. 
If Hallstrom insists that the guaranty given by 
Buhler is absolute, as the law defines ''absolute guaran-
ty" (see Point II, infra), then he must be taken to admit 
that the transachon was in fact a loan. Such a conclu-
sion is inescapable frmn the authorities disclosed in Point 
I. They hold that the prime element to he considered 
in determining whether this transaction was a sale or a 
loan is whether, when Hallstroms advanced the money 
to Buhler, they risked anything ·other than the declining 
value of their security until such time as they received 
the moneys for which they contracted. Clearly if the 
guaranty is absolute, all they risked was the decline in 
value of the security. 
If, on the other hand, Hallstroms insist they 
''bought" the contract on the assumpti,on that it was an 
.. investment", then it is quite· obvious that the guaranty 
is conditional - conditional on Hallstroms suffering a 
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loss after exhausting their remedies against the Snyders 
under the real estate contract. But if it is a conditional 
guaranty it is subject to the rules pertaining thereto 
as outlined in Point II, infra. 
Faced with this dilemma, the plaintiff must neces-
sarily choose one course or the other. In either case, and 
whichever course he chooses to pursue he must submit 
certain questions of fact and of law to the Trial Court 
for determination. Consequently, the Trial Court erred 
in entering judgment upon the pleadings and in not fram-
ing the questions outlined herein. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO FRMIE AN ISSUE AS TO· \VHETHER 
THE TRANSACTION BET·WEEN THE. PAR-
TIE.S WAS IN F AC'T A LOAN RATHER 
THAN A SALE AND AS SUCH, WAS USUR-
IOU1S. 
It was contended by the defendant in his Answer 
that the transaction between himself and Hallstrom was 
a loan rather than a sale (R.ll). The chain of events 
began when Buhler needed $15,000.00. Upon a trial of 
the issues, he would show that he sought first to borrow 
the money, pledging his equity in the Snyder contract 
as security. He proceeded by contacting the Contract & 
Mortgage Exchange, of Salt Lake City, a business op-
erated by one Roland W. Funk. 
Buhler would show that Hallstrom refused to loan 
any money to Buhler on the security of the contract. 
After negotiation, the parties agreed that Buhler would 
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assig-n $19,938.86 of his equity in the contract to Hall-
sti·oms (R.20). At thP sa.me time Hallstrom insisted up-
on a guaranty, which toak the fonn of the mortgage 
sued upon. (R.5). In addition to the guaranty given by 
Buhler, the plaintiff insisted upon a guaranty from Ro-
land W. F1mk (R.21). To protect Funk, Buhler gave 
him a note and mortgage on his property in the sum 
of $5,000.00 (R.33). In consideration of all of this Hall-
~trOin gave Buhler $14,371.88. 
Presumably, Hallstrom contends that the transac-
tion between the parties is a sale, as distinguished from 
a loan. (Actually, Hallstrom simply sought to foreclose 
the mortgage without coming to grips with the under-
lying problems.) But when one makes a sale of proper-
ty, it is normally assumed that the buyer runs the risks 
incident to ownership of the property purchased. It is 
true that in form the transaction involved here appears 
to be a sale, but the courts have been traditionally re-
luctant to pennit mere form to prevail over substance. 
(See the discussion at 154 ALR 1063.) 
In one of the more recent cases discussing the prob-
lem, (Britz vs. Kinswater (1960) 87 Ariz. 385, 351 P. 2d 
986), the court looked at the transaction from the stand-
point of what the buyer-lender was risking and what the 
seller-borrower was giving up. One of the criteria used 
by the court to detennine that the transaction was a 
loan rather than a sale was the fact that the "Seller" was 
to receive the contract back when the "Buyer" had re-
ceived the designated amount assigned from the contract. 
This fact, coupled with the fact that the ''Buyer" in that 
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case was to receive his money absolutely and in all events, 
as here, and that he was not familiar with the property 
which he "bought", led the court t.o hold that the trans-
action was one of loan rather than sale. Other cases sup-
porting this test are Freedman vs. Hendershott (19'55, 
Idaho) 290 P. 2d 738; DeWulf vs. Bissell (1957) 83 Ariz. 
68, 316 P. 2d 492; and Cowles vs. Zlaket (1959, Calif.) 
334 P. 2d 55. 
While the record here indicates that the assignment, 
by its terms, was absolute, the Pleadings of Plaintiff 
(R.1-5), when read together with the terms of the Buhler-
Snyder contract (R.24 at 27), indicate that Hallstrom 
himself believed he was only entitled to receive a por-
tion of the contract balance and not the whole amount. 
Anything over the amount contracted for was to go to 
Buhler. 
Under the arrangement of the parties, Hallstrom 
was to receive $6,568.97 more than he could receive had 
he loaned Buhler the money at 10% per annum, the 
maximum legal rate of interest. (See Sec. 15-1-2, UCA, 
1953; Appendix "A" of this Brief). And Hallstrom was 
to receive this sum in a.ny and aU events; if Snyder didn't 
pay it, Buhler had to. The legal definition of the word 
"loan" states that it involves the delivery of money or 
prt>perty by one to another and the money or property 
must be returned in any and all events. (See 54 CJS 657) 
Even the judgment as rendered awards Hallstrom 
$3,1123.01 more than he would be entitled to receive had 
he loaned the money to Buhler at the maximum rate of 
interest (See Appendix "B" of this Brief). 
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We do not ask this Court at this time to determine 
that the transaction was in fact a loan rather than a sale. 
What we do ask is that this court reverse the judgment 
entered by the trial court and remand the case with 
instruct~ons to raise the issues set forth in the ple·adings 
as defined in this brief and to try the case on that basis. 
POINT' II 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FRAMING 
ISS.UES OF LAW AND FACT AS TO 
WHETHER HALLSTROMS WER.E EN-
TITLED TO RE·COVER UNDER THE GUAR-
ANTY AND, IF SO, WHkT T'HEIR LOS:S 
WAS., AND IN REFUSING TO SE'T ASID·E. 
THE JUDGMENT IN ORD·ER TO TRY SUCH 
ISSUES. 
The instrument sued upon by plaintiff is a mort-
gage on real property which recites in the body of the 
instrument that it is given for the purpose of guaran-
teeing payment of a contract assigned by the Mortgagors 
to the :Mortgagee (R.5). The complaint also recites that 
the mortgage was given for the purpose of guaranteeing 
the performance of buyers under the contract assigned 
plaintiff (R.l). The1 answer denies the material allega-
tions of the complaint and as a defense sets up that no 
notice was given of the breach of the principal contract 
and further states that the plaintiffs failed to fix their 
loss under the contract against the principal and thus 
did not comply with the conditions precedent to the bring-
ing of the action (R.l0-13). 
The pre-trial order recognizes that the action is one 
to enforce a guaranty, but does not require Hallstrom 
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to comply with the necessary elements required by law 
in such an action before he can recover. It n1entions only 
one of the issues raised by Buhler's Answer and Counter-
claim. It does not permit Buhler to make any showing 
to rebut Hallstroms' contentions (R.18,19). Apparent-
ly discussion was had concerning payments and amounts, 
but these amounts were never placed in the Order (R.18). 
The shortcomings of the Pre-Trial Order were brought 
to the .attention of the Court in motions and affidavits 
filed by Buhler February 9, 1962. The motions were 
denied the day after judgment was entered. 
Under the law of guaranty the courts generally di-
vide guaranties into two catagories: one is referred to 
as an absolute guaranty and the other as a conditional 
guaranty. The absolute guaranty is one by which the 
guarantor unconditionally promises payment or perform-
ance· on the principal contract on default of the principal 
debtor or obligor. A conditional guaranty is one which 
is not enforceable immediately upon the default of the 
principal debtor ; some contingency other than default 
must happen or the guarantee must take some steps to 
fix the liability under the guaranty. (Wall vs. Eccles, 
(1922) 61 Utah 247, 211 P. 702; 38 CJS 1139, Guarwnty, 
Sec 7.) 
In effect, it was contended by Buhler's Answer that 
the guaranty given by him in this case is .a conditional 
guaranty. We presume that Hallstrom would contend that 
the guaranty is absolute. Whether it is one or the other 
depends on the intention of the parties to be gleand from 
the facts surrounding the transaction. ( 38 CJ S 1179, 
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Guarooty, Sec. 38). The mortgage as given is quite ob-
viously ambiguous. It guarantees the payments due to 
be made by Snyder, but does not specify whether Hall-
stom is to be protected after pursuing his remedies un-
der the assignment, or before. Since the Hallstroms 
first pursued their remedy against the Idaho property, 
they construed the guaranty as conditional. 
Even if, at first blush, the guaranty involved here 
might he thought of as absolute, Hallstrom treated it 
as a conditional guaranty because he took over the Ida-
ho property and ultimately resold it (R.38). The rule 
in such cases is set forth in 38 OJ S 1179, Guaranty, Sec. 
38a, as follows : 
"Where the parties have given the guaranty 
a practical construction, such as by their acts in 
carrying· it out, such construction should he given 
great, if not controlling, weight in determining 
its proper interpretation, except that such con:.. 
struction cannot be considered where· there is no 
ambiguity in the language of the-guaranty." 
Since the guaranty was construed by the plaintiff as 
conditional he would necessarily have to oomply with 
the conditions precedent and fix his loss under the terms 
of the guaranty. In the process of doing so, he would 
have to show he diligently pursued the collateral secur-
ity. (38 CJS 1219, Guaranty, Sec. 61) 
If the guaranty should be considered absolute, then 
Hallstrom really loaned Buhler the money, as discussed 
in Point I, supra. 
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In any event, whether or not the guaranty is abso-
lute or conditional, the guarantor is entitled to credit 
on the debt for any proceeds which the guarantee has 
received. See 38 CJ S 1245, Guara;n,ty, Sec. 77 a, where it 
says: 
" ... if the principal obligation is satisfied 
in part, the guarantor will be discharged pro 
tanto and not entirely, unless a portion of the 
debt due is accepted in full settlement." 
Again, Hallstron1 sold the property out from under 
the defendant Buhler (R .. 38). iThe rule quite clearly 
says that in terms of guaranty he may thereby waive 
his right against the guarantor. See 38 CJS 1296, Guwr-
anty, Sec. 109, where it says in part: 
" ... In general a creditor is under a duty to 
avoid doing anything which will prejudice the 
guarantor's rights and remedies against the prin-
cipal and with respect to security relied on by 
the guarantor for reimbursement." 
It is also stated at 38 CJS 1258, Gwaranty, Sec. 87 as fol-
lows: 
" ... It is a condition precedent to the bring-
ing of suit to enforce a guaranty that the e:xtent 
of the liability be determinable." 
Thus there are many factors involved in this case 
which are yet to be determined and the judgment of the 
trial court was premature, to say the least . There are 
issues of fact and law which should have been set down 
for trial and the judgment should be reversed and set 
aside and the ease remanded for trial ·on those issues. 
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POINT III 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FAC~r, CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW AND DECREE DO NOT 
·CONFORM TO THE PLEADINGS OR 
PROOF, AND .AT· THE VERY LEAST MUST· 
BE CORRECTED A·CCORDINGLY. 
On January 10, 1962 the lower court directed that 
judgment be entered against the defendants "as prayed" 
(R. 19'). The complaint recites that the amount owing 
on the contract guaranteed was $17,938.86, together with 
interest at the rate of 5%. The complaint further recites 
that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees and costs. 
The prayer of the complaint requests that the court de-
terrnine the amount due and owing in favor of plaintiffs 
including costs and expenses and that the mortgage be 
foreclosed and the property s·old as provided by law. 
As illustrated in the Statement of Facts, supra, the Find-
ings, Conclusions and Decree ·award Hallstrom recovery 
for an additional group of items not mentioned in the 
complaint, all of which add up to a sum considerably in 
excess of that requested. 
Since the law seems to be quite clear that the judg-
ment when entered in any case 1nust conform to the 
pleadings and proof in such case (Miller vs. Johnson 
(1913) 43 Utah 468, 134 P. 1017; Shurtleff vs. Salt Lake 
City (1938) 96 Utah 21, 82 P. 2d 561), at the very least, 
this Court should send the matter back to the District 
Court for modification of the Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree to conform to the allegations of the complaint. 
Otherwise the plaintiffs will recover an additional 
$2,847.48, plus interest, which they did not contemplate 
getting when they brought this action. 
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Obviously this case is not the run of the mine fore-
closure action. It involves many issues which are com-
plex and which should be properly aired in justice to all 
parties. 
We respectfully submit that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree should be set aside, and 
the case remanded to the ·Trial Court for trial on the 
following issues : 
1. Was the transaction between the parties a loan 
or a sale~ 
2. If the transaction was a loan, was the loan usur-
ious~ 
3. Was the guaranty sued upon absolute or condi-
tional~ 
4. If conditional, did the Plaintiff fulfill all of the 
conditions precedent to bringing suit~ 
5. If conditional, did the Plaintiff waive his rights 
against the Defendant by selling the Idaho property~ 
6. To what extent is the guarantor liable, if at all, 
under his guaranty~ 
At the very least, the judgment must be corrected 
to conform to the pleadings and proof. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & MOYLE 
By Hardin A. Whitney, Jr. 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Defenda;nts-Appellants 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Computation Showing Rate of Pay Off and 
Additional Sums Hallstrom Contracted 
To Receive Over That Allowed If He Had 
Loaned Buhler $14,371.88 at 10% Interest Per Annum 
Interest at Amount 
Payment 10% Per Credited to Principal 
Date (Note 1) Annum Principal Balance 
Aug. 5, 1959 ___________ _ 
Dec. 1, 1959 ____________ $3,204.64 
Dec. 1, 1960 ____________ 2,896.94 
Dec. 1, 196L ___________ 2,796.94 
Dec. 1, 1962 ____________ 2,696.94 
Dec. 1, 1963 ____________ 2,596.94 
Dec. 1, 1964 ____________ 2,496.94 
Dec. 1, 1965 ____________ 2,396.94 
$ 459.10 
1,162.63 
989.20 
808.43 
619.58 
42.1.84 
214.33 
$2,745.54 
1,734.31 
1,807.74 
1,888.51 
1,977.36 
2,075.10 
2,182.61 
On December 1, 1965 Hallstrom would have 
received an amount over that which he would 
$14,371.88 
11,626.34 
9,892.03 
8,084.2,9 
6,195.78 
4,218.42 
2,143.32 
(39.29) 
have received on a loan at 10% interest of ________ $ 39.29 
He would then be entitled to receive additional 
sums as follows : 
Dec. 1, 1966 ---------------------------------------------------------- 2,296.94 
Dec. 1, 1967------------------------------------------------------------ 2,196.94 
Dec. 1, 1968------------------------------------------------------------ 2,035.80 
Total Hallstrom entitled to by Contract 
over maximum interest --------------------------------$6,568.97 
Note 1-Taken from Exhibit "D" to L. M. Buhler's affidavit, 
Record, page 32 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Computation Comparing A ward of Judgment to Hallstrom 
By Trial Court With Amount He Would 
Receive Had He Loaned Buhler $14,371.88 
at 10% Interest Per Annum 
Unpaid Mortgage balance (without interest) 
determined by Decree --------------------------------------$18,167.31 
Amounts Received by Hallstrom to date (R. 21) 3,200.00 
Total awarded to or received by Hallstrom ____ $21,367.31 
Moneys advanced Buhler by Hallstrom (R. 8) 14,371.88 
Recovery by Hallstrom over monies advanced 
(excluding interest awarded by judgment) $ 6,995.43 
Interest on $14,371.88 at 10% per annum 
from Aug. 5, 1959 (date money advanced) 
to April 16, 1962 (date of judgment), a 
period of 2 years, 8 months, 11 days____________ 3,872.42 
Excess recovery --------------------------------------------------------$ 3,123.01 
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